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The effect that health has on the retirement decision has long been studied.  We examine the 
reverse relationship, whether retirement has a direct impact on later-life health.  To identify the 
causal relationship, we use early retirement window offers to instrument for retirement.  We find 
no negative effects of early retirement on men’s health, and if anything, a temporary increase in 
self-reported  health  and  improvements  in  health  of  highly  educated  workers.    While  this  is 
consistent with previous literature using Social Security ages as instruments, we also find that 





1  Introduction 
 
“They say the number one killer of old people is retirement.” – Budd, Kill Bill Vol 2 
 
What are the health effects  of the act  of  retiring?  While this is  an  important  question  with 
pertinent policy consequences, little is currently known about the answer.  As talk of raising 
retirement  ages  in  pensions  and  social  security  schemes  continues  around  the  world,  it  is 
important to know both the costs and benefits for the individual as well as the government or 
pension fund’s budgets and health care expenditures.   
The notion that retirement harms health is an old and persistent hypothesis.  (See Minkler 
1981 for a review.)  Many argue that retirement itself is a stressful event (Carp 1967, Eisdorfer 
and Wilkie 1977, MacBride 1976, Sheppard 1976).  This stressful event could lead to increased 
illness susceptibility.  Even for those for whom retirement is not a stressful event, it still can lead 
to a break with support networks and friends, and may be accompanied by emotional or mental 
impacts of “loneliness,” “obsolescence,” or “feeling old” (Bradford 1979, MacBride 1976). If 
retirement has a negative net affect on health, then increasing the retirement age may lead to 
better overall health for individuals and an improved budgetary outlook for the government. 
Others  believe  that  retirement  is  a  health-preserving  life  change.  Anecdotal  evidence 
suggests that many “kitchen table” discussions about the timing of retirement include the idea that 
work  is  stressful  and  taxing  to  the  individual,  thus  retirement  would  remove  this  stress  and 
preserve the health of the retiree (Ekardt et al, 1983).    
Despite  the  long-standing  debate,  there  is  little  conclusive  evidence  thus  far.    The 
question is much more difficult to answer than would appear at first glance. The inherent problem 
is that retirement is often a choice and health may have a direct impact on the decision to retire. 
Furthermore there are unobservable factors that may confound the health and work relationship. 
Many of the early studies do not address this, and thus can only infer association, not causation. 
Compounding the problem is that some of these early studies find a positive correlation with 
health (Thomson et al 1958), no correlation with health (Carp 1977, Atchey 1976, Kasl 1980, 
Rowland  1977,  Haynes  et  al  1978,  Niemi  1980,  Adams  and  Lefebvre  1981),  or  a  negative 
correlation with health (Casscells et al 1980, Gonzales 1980).   
Properly addressing the endogeneity of retirement behavior and health is a difficult task. 
Identification  of  the  causal  relations  between  health  and  labor  market  outcomes  requires 





recent papers acknowledge this, but have problems directly dealing with it.  Tsai et al (2005) 
measure the post-65 retirement mortality rates for individuals, regardless of the age of retirement.  
While they find that those retired at age 55 do have higher post-65 mortality rates, the hypothesis 
that earlier health problems lead to the early retirement behavior cannot be rejected.  Further, 
since  they  only  examine  mortality  rates,  more  subtle  changes  in  health  outcomes  may  be 
overlooked.  Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997) assess the effects of work history on the health 
status of older workers using fixed effects regressions. This accounts for time invariant factors 
that may confound the results, but it does not account for time varying factors such as a sudden 
change in the individual environment. Their results suggest that health deteriorates with increased 
work  efforts  and  that  increasing  retirement  ages  may  negatively  influence  later  life  health 
outcomes. Lindeboom et al (2002) look at the effect of life events on the mental health of older 
individuals. These life events include retirement and they try to control for all transitory changes 
as well as individual fixed-effects. They find no statistical effect of loss of work with mental 
health measured 2-years later. This does not address any physical health affects of retirement, 
either  positive  or  negative,  and  actually  controls  for  all  physical  health  deterioration  that  is 
observed in the data.  Thus, this may fail to measure the true cumulative impact of retirement on 
physical and mental health.    
In  order  to  assess  the  causal  impact  of  retirement  on  health,  one  needs  to  find  an 
instrument that is related to retirement behavior, but uncorrelated with health. Charles (2002) and 
Neuman  (2007)  use  age  specific  retirement  incentives  provided  by  the  US  Social  Security 
regulations. The US Social Security system provides strong retirement incentives at ages 62, 65, 
70 and 72 and these age cutoffs can be used to identify the effect of retirement on age, assuming 
there are no discontinuous changes in health at these ages except those induced by retirement. 
Charles (2002) focuses on mental well-being and finds that the direct effect of retirement on 
mental well-being is positive, once the fact that retirement and mental well-being are jointly 
determined is accounted for. Neuman (2007) uses both subjective and more objective measures of 
health. He finds that retirement preserves subjective health for both men and women. For the 
objective measures he does not find an effect of retirement. Bound and Waidmann (2008) use 
institutional features of the UK pension system that are exogenous to the individual and find no 
evidence of negative health effects of retirement. For men they find some evidence for a positive 
effect of retirement on health.    Coe and Zamarro (2008) use institutional features of the pension 





In this paper we consider a broad set of health indicators, including mortality, for both 
blue- and white-collar workers. For the identification of the causal effect we acknowledge that 
age specific retirement incentives of the US Social Security system may aid in the identification 
of  the  health  effects  of  retirement,  but  in  addition  exploit  sudden  changes  in  retirement 
opportunities  in  order  to  assess  the  health  effect  of  retirement.    Data  from  the  Health  and 
Retirement  Survey  (HRS)  includes  information  on  the  offering,  and  acceptance,  of  early 
retirement windows.  Early retirement windows are special incentives to retire at a specific time 
offered by employers to employees.  The offering of early retirement windows is exogenous to an 
individual’s  health.  While  it  is  in  the  company’s  best  interest  to  limit  the  early  retirement 
windows to the least productive members of the company, this may or may not be orthogonal to 
health status of the workers. In addition, while management can select groups of workers to be 
eligible for early retirement windows, their power to limit eligibility is limited by the courts (987 
F. Supp. 1115, S.D. Ind. 1997, ruled that the eligibility decisions cannot be seen as "arbitrary and 
capricious."). We conclude from analyses of our data that the offering of a retirement window can 
indeed be considered as exogenous in our sample. Retirement windows generally allow workers 
to retire at substantially younger ages than age 62, the earliest opportunity for benefits provided 
by Social Security. Thus we add substantial exogenous variation in the retirement date that can be 
used to identify the causal effect of retirement on health and mortality.  
 
 
2  A simple model for health and work 
 
Let us start with a simple framework for modeling the potential relationship between 
health and work.  Let us assume that retirement is an absorbing state
1, and an individual worker 
chooses  the  retirement  date  that  maximizes  life  time  utility,  Vt=U(yt,yt+1,…,yT,Ht,  Ht+1,…,HT), 
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1 This might not be reasonable for the US with the increased frequency of “bridge-jobs”, but this seems less 
important in this case due to using early retirement windows as an instrument, where few return to work 





with uy >0, uyy < 0,  uH >0 and uHH <0. When at work an individual receives income yt= wt, when 
retired yt=Bt, with wt > Bt. Work yields a per-period utility of ut = wt Ht -α, with α being the 
disutility of work, and non-work (retirement) ut = Bt Ht.  
The  relation  between  Bt  and  wt  is  determined  by  the  rules  of  the  retirement system. 
Generally it is the case that continued work is associated with higher benefit levels. Another 
source of dynamics in this model is that the work choices may affect health. Work, or aspects of 
work, may cause health to decline at a faster rate
2. Also, individual health may change after 
retirement,  for  instance  due  to  changes  in  the  individual  context,  the  social  network  and 
psychological changes after retirement. A priori it is not clear whether retirement would cause 
health to decrease at a faster or slower rate.   
According  to  the  structure  of  the  model  the  individual  chooses  the  optimal  date  of 
retirement, taking into account the health effects of retirement and the effect of continued work 
on retirement income.  Suppose that there are two periods and that an individual has to decide to 
retire  at  the  normal  mandatory  retirement  age  (period  1),  or  at  an  earlier  age  (period  0). 
Retirement at period 0 gives a benefit b
-, retirement at a later age gives benefit b
+. So early 
retirement provides income y0=B0= b
- during period 0 and y1=B1= b
-, during period 1. Health 
remains at its initial level H0 during period 0, but the decision to retire or not affects health after 
retirement (period 1). More specifically, we assume that health becomes HS if the individual stops 
working (retires) at age 0 and becomes HW if (s)he continues working (delays retirement until 
period 1).  HW and HS can be interpreted as the flow of health up to death. Thus the value of 
retiring at the start of period 0 equals: 
S
S H b H b V
− − + = β 0 0                 (2a) 
 
with β a discount factor. The value of continued work (retiring in period 1) equals: 
W
W H b wH V
+ + − = β α 0 0               (2b) 
 
So an individual retires at an early date if and only if 
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2 The rate of deterioration may also depend on the kind of work. We ignore this in the simple model, but 





Equations  (3)  states  that  for  the  early  retirement  decision  the  current  and  long  run 
monetary  costs  of  immediate  retirement  (the  first  two  terms)  should  be  balanced  with  the 
disutility and the health cost of later retirement. A priori we do not want to impose whether HS is 
smaller or larger than HW. Retirement is delayed when the health effects of later retirement are 
relatively small or even positive (HW is relatively high), the monetary gains of continued work are 
high (b
+ high relative to b
-) and the disutility of work (α) is low. So changes in the parameters of 
the retirement system will affect the work continuation decision and will consequently also affect 
the average health condition of the retirees in the last stage of life.   Suppose for instance that 
individuals vary with respect to their disutility of work and that α is randomly distributed. Then 
the average health of retirees in period 1 equals: 
W S H p pH H ) 1 ( 1 − + =               (5) 
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+ − + − β β α .  Low  initial 
replacement rates (b
-/w) and high benefit accrual rates (b
+-b
- is large) stimulate later retirement 
(small p) so that a larger fraction of the population will continue working. As a consequence 
average post retirement (period 1) population health will decrease (if HW < HS) or increase (if HW 
> HS).  This important side-effect of retirement policy on health, and related health care costs, 
needs to be taken into account when considering changes in retirement policy and its effects on 
the overall government budget. 
Some remarks remain before we return to the empirical model. First, extending the 2-
period model to a multi-period model will not alter the basic results of the model. For instance, 
suppose that retirement at age t yields a benefit Bt and continued work a wage wt. The decision to 
retire can be written as a sequence of per period comparison of the value of continued work (Vt 
W ) 
with the value of immediate retirement (Vt 
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An individual retires if Vt 
W < Vt 
S. Future health is included in the future value functions 
and in this way the individual worker takes the health effects of (non) retirement into account. 
One could  make  the  development in health and  how  it relates to labor  market choices  more 
explicitly, for instance by taking the health production function suggested by Grossman (1972): 






The health production function (7) relates the change in the health stock to the investment 
I(t) and the depreciation of health (δ). The health investment can be a function of (medical), 
consumption and time investments in health, like the decision to continue or stop working. An 
empirical counterpart of (7) would boil down to a dynamic model where current health outcomes 
are related to past health, labor supply choices and other individual characteristics to capture 
other non-time health investments. We return to this in the next section.  
Second, one could also make T (the date of death) endogenous, for instance by assuming 
that death occurs if the health stock falls below a critical level, say H*.  If one believes that work 
will keep people active and that adverse health effects of work are small or absent, then it will 
take a longer time before health falls below the critical level. If, on the other hand one assumes 
that a worker’s health deteriorates faster while at work, for instance because of work stress, bad 
working conditions etc, then death will arrive at an earlier date. In the simple model these effects 
are implicit in the composite post-retirement health constructs HS and HW and therefore these 
additions will not alter the basic mechanism.  
 
 
3  Analytical framework  
 
The ultimate goal is to assess the health effects of later (or earlier) retirement. We use the 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), described in detail in the next section. Implementation of 
the model requires us to be more specific about the relation between later life health and the 
retirement decision. We modify the health production function above (7) to fit our empirical 
framework.  The health investment function I(t) could be allowed to depend on labor market 
choices, such as the decision to retire, and other socio-demographic characteristics (to represent 
other health investments decisions). In line with this, one could relate an indicator for health at 
age t +1 to health at t, whether or not an individual has retired in period [t,t+1], Rt, and individual 
characteristics X:  
it it
t
it it it H X R H ε δ γ γ γ γ + − + + + + = + ) 1 ( 1 2 1 0 1         (7’) 
 
Of course one could specify more general equations than (7’), for instance by allowing 
the time since retirement to have an effect or by allowing for heterogeneous effects. To extend on 
the latter, health effects may, for instance, differ with respect to occupation. The health effects of 





construction sector may be different from the health effects of a job that does not involve physical 
work in the service sector. We use equation (7’) as a base specification, but will also estimate 
models for longer run health effects and models that allow for different effects for blue- and 
white-collar workers and other subgroups.   
In the empirical analyses we will focus on individuals at work in [t-2] and look at their 
health outcomes at a later point in time. The parameter of interest is γ1. As discussed earlier, 
assessing the causal effect of the act of retirement is not trivial. A forward-looking agent plans 
retirement, taking later life health (developments) into account. This means that the retirement 
status and (later life) health are jointly determined and that we need exogenous variation in the 
retirement decision to assess its causal effect on health.  
  One  way  to  proceed  is to  look  at  changes in  Social  Security  or  pension regulations. 
Examples are Charles (2002) and Neuman (2007), who use age specific retirement incentives 
provided by the US Social Security regulations and (Charles 2002) changes in these due to the 
1983 amendments. This method has also been employed in an international context: Bound and 
Waidmann (2008) use age specific retirement incentives of the UK pension system and Coe and 
Zamarro (2008) for continental Europe. The idea is that US Social Security system provides 
strong incentives towards retirement at ages 62, 65, 70 and 72. For the UK this is age 65 for 
males and age 60 for females, and range between age 60 and 65 for men in continental Europe. 
These studies use these age cutoffs to identify the effect of retirement on age, assuming there are 
no discontinuous changes in health at these ages except those induced by retirement. We will rely 
on exogenous variation induced by early retirement windows and return to the merits of this 
approach compared to the approaches by Charles (2002), Neuman (2007), Bound and Waidmann 
(2008) and Coe and Zamarro (2008) in subsection 3.1.c.     
 
3.1 Early Retirement Windows as an Instrument 
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that provide information on 
the offering of early retirement windows to individual workers and use this as an instrument for 
retirement.  Early retirement windows are special incentives to retire at a specific time offered by 
employers  to  employees.    These  windows  are  often  of  a  relatively  short  duration  and  offer 
enhanced retirement benefits for early retirement (for example, offering extra years of service for 
a defined benefit pension plan.)  These are often offered to workers in “career” jobs, and are often 







3.1a  Which companies offer an Early Retirement Window? 
Companies often offer early retirement windows as a way to reduce staff size without 
massive layoffs or harboring ill-will.  According to a 1992 Towers Perrin survey, more than 20 
percent of the 534 U.S. companies surveyed  offered  one or  more retirement windows  in the 
previous four years. The windows were most common in large companies in the manufacturing, 
utilities and banking industries. Eligibility for retirement incentives was based primarily on age 
and service, rather than pay level. On average, about 10 percent of the workforce was eligible for 
the special retirement benefits. Some companies that have offered early retirement windows in 
the past include Eastman Kodak, Du Pont, Exxon, Polaroid, Xerox, R.J. Reynolds, IBM, Ford and 
AT&T (Time 1983 and Towers Perrin 1992). 
  A Watson Wyatt survey (2001) reports that among companies offering early retirement 
windows, 92 percent report that these offerings allowed them to meet their staff reduction targets.  
These reduction targets could exist due to recessions, mergers and acquisitions, or a change in 
corporate management models.   
 
3.1b Which employees are offered an Early Retirement Window? 
The offering of early retirement windows is exogenous to an individual’s health.  While it 
is in the company’s best interest to only offer early retirement windows to the least productive 
members of the company, this is illegal.  Early retirement windows are often targeted at specific 
units or divisions (Towers Perrin 1992).  Management can select groups of workers to be eligible 
for early retirement windows, but their power to limit individual eligibility is limited by the courts.  
987 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D. Ind. 1997) ruled that the eligibility decisions cannot be seen as "arbitrary 
and capricious."  Further, employees interested in early retirement windows but ineligible for the 
offers companies make have a history of suing the company
3, reducing the ability of the company 
to limit eligibility for early retirement window offerings to the least productive members of the 
labor force.   
Brown  (2002),  using  the  Health  and  Retirement  Study,  examines  the  observable 
characteristics of those who are offered early retirement windows versus those who are not.  He 
finds that those offered early retirement windows are actually in better health, on average, than 
those not offered the early retirement.  This is due to the purpose and the general targeting of the 
                                                 
3  See Krawczyk v. Harnischfeger Corp., 41 F.3d 276, 278-79 (7th Cir. 1994); Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 
771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985); Albert C. McNab, et al v General Motors Corp.; Lockheed Corp. v. 
Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996); Johnson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 19 F.3d 1184 (7th Cir. 1994); McGath v. 
Auto-Body North Shore, Inc., 7 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 1993); Henn v. National Geographic Society, 819 F.2d 





early retirement windows to “career” workers, who are less likely to be in physically demanding 
jobs.
4 Further, one-third of those who are offered early retirement windows subsequently accept 
them.  Brown  (2003)  finds  that  individuals  who  accept  an  offer  through  an  early  retirement 
window  are  more  likely  to  experience  a  sharp  decline  in  labor  force  participation.  These 
individuals  tend  not to  go  to  work  elsewhere  after this  “buy-out”.    This  suggests  that  being 
offered an early retirement window is a good instrument for actual retirement behavior. In section 
4.1 we will formally test whether the offering of a retirement window is a strong predictor for 
retirement.  
 
3.1c Comparing the offering of windows with age specific retirement incentives as instruments 
There are some advantages of using the offering of a retirement window over the age 
specific  retirement  incentives  provided  by  the  US Social  Security  regulations  (Charles  2002, 
Neuman  2007).  First,  the  age  specific  retirement  incentives  are  fully  predictable  from  the 
individual’s point of view. A first consequence of this is that workers may offset possible health 
effects of retirement by adjusting their behavior prior to these ages. This suggests that the effects 
of retirement may be biased towards zero, or even upwards (towards better health outcomes) 
when one uses these instruments.
5 Another consequence of the predictability of the retirement 
date  might  be  that  the  impact  of  the  retirement  decision  might  not  coincide  with  the  actual 
retirement date. For instance, there may be mental health effects prior to the retirement date if one 
is  anticipating  retirement  for  a  long  period  (similar  to  an  “Ashenfelter  dip”).  This  has 
consequences for the specification of the retirement effect in health production models like (7’). 
Second, related to the above, the timing of the offering of a window is something that a worker 
cannot  fully  predict  and  therefore  it  is  less  likely  that  anticipation  effects  will  affect  health 
outcomes prior to the offering of the retirement window. Furthermore, this additional source of 
random variation in the retirement age aids in the identification of the causal effect. Smith (2003) 
follows a similar reasoning using unanticipated changes in health (“health shocks”) to identify the 
causal effect of health on wealth.  Third, a substantial share of the workforce retires before the 
official retirement ages. For instance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the median 
retirement age for men is 62 years.  In our sample retirement windows are offered from age 50 to 
age 70. This better reflects the retirement age distribution of male US workers. 
                                                 
4 This may bias the results. For instance, the estimate will be biased towards zero if retirement has a 
negative effect on health. In the empirical analyses we will examine whether this is relevant for our sample 
and whether we need to restrict our analyses to specific types of workers.    





We  include  a  section  on  the  sensitivity  of  our  findings  with  respect  to  our  choice  of 
instrument.  We  will test how  the results  are affected  when  we  include  age  specific retirement 
incentives as additional instruments in the analysis. 
  
 
4  Data 
   
The data are from the Health and Retirement Study, conducted by the Survey Center of the 
University of Michigan. This is a  longitudinal  survey  of  people  born in  1931-1941 and their 
spouses (regardless of age) starting in 1992 with follow-up interviews every 2 years.  Currently, 7 
waves of data are available (1992-2004).  When weighted to account for initial over-sampling of 
some population groups and for subsequent attrition, the HRS provides a representative sample of 
those in this birth cohort.  
The HRS collects substantial information about mental and physical health, using both 
objective and subjective measures. This allows one to test a variety of potential health affects of 
retirement, without relying solely on the most drastic measure of health, namely death. We focus 
on physical and mental health. It is expected that mental health is more responsive in the short run 
to changes in the individual environment therefore the effects of the act of retiring (if present) 
will be easier to detect. For mental health we use an indicator of depression derived from the 
Center  for  Epidemiologic  Studies  Depression  Scale  (CES-D,  Radloff  1977).  The  CES-D 
measures  emotional  functioning  (ranging  from  0-8,  with  higher  values  being  worse).  An 
individual is considered to be depressed if the CES-D exceeds the clinically determined threshold 
level of five. As measures for physical health we include the outcome of the ADL test (values 
from 0-5, with higher values being worse), whether the individual has diabetes, and whether the 
individual has (had) cancer or a heart attack. It is important to note that the diabetes and cancer 
variables are derived from questions like “Has a doctor ever told you that you had …..” This 
implies that once individuals are observed to have a condition in one wave, they also have the 
condition in the following waves. We return to this issue in the beginning of section 5 where we 
discuss estimation issues. We also examine, whether the individual has high blood pressure, self 
reports about one’s general health status (an indicator variable equal to one if the individual 
reports being in very good or excellent health), and mortality. We define retirement when people 
report to be out of the labor force, or not having any paid employment. 
  In order to complete the analysis, we make a variety of sample restrictions.  First, we 





for retirement.  Second, we limit the sample to those who are interviewed in at least two waves.
6  
  Since the HRS is a panel dataset, these individuals are subsequently followed through 2004.   
Thus we examine individual health outcomes in the future due to past retirement behavior.  We look 
at health outcomes 2 and 4 years after a potential retirement decision.  We also stack the dataset for 
more observations.  We continue to limit inclusion in the dataset to working in the base period.  
Thus an individual who is working in 1992 and 1994, but retires in 1998 would be in the dataset 
twice, while someone who works in 1992 and retires in 1994 would only be included once.  We 
cluster the standard errors to take into account the multiple observations of the same person, as well 
as include control variables for the wave of interview. 
The sample includes 3657 male workers of which 2158 are blue-collar workers and 2038 
white-  collar  workers. As independent  variables  we  include wave  dummies,  education,  marital 
status, the number of children, wealth (in percentiles) age nonlinearly (age and age squared), and 
indicator variables for blue-collar worker, race, ethnicity, and foreign-born.   
  Table 1 reports sample averages for some important health variables and controls. Around 
20% of the sample retires during our observation period. The table also confirms what Brown (2002) 
already  concluded,  namely  that the sample  of  people  who  received  a window  offer  is  slightly 
younger  and  healthier  than  the  sample  as  a  whole.  In  section  4.1  we  will  further  look  at  the 
relationship between health and the offering of a retirement window.   
 
 4.1 Early Retirement Windows 
  Early retirement windows are a limited-time offer, typically lasting six weeks to three 
months (Towers Perrin 1992).  The HRS question starts with defining an early retirement window, 
stating: 
   
“ Employers sometimes encourage older workers to leave a firm at a particular time 
by  offering  a  special  financial  incentive,  like  a  cash  bonus  or  improved  pension 
benefits.  These are often called “early retirement windows.”  
 
The respondents are then asked: 
 
                                                 
6 Due to the mandatory time spent out of the labor market before being eligible for disability benefits and 
the time lag between disability application and benefit receipt, we have done specification tests limiting the 
sample  to  those  who  have  never  applied  for  disability  benefits  before  2004.    The  results  are  not 






  “Have you ever been offered such an early retirement window on any job?” 
 
The survey then solicits information on how many offers the individual has received, when the 
offer(s) was received, which employer made it, what was offered in the plan, and whether it was 
accepted.  If the offer was accepted, they ask if the offer was influential in their decision to leave 
the job.  If the offer was rejected, they ask if the offer would have induced a job change if the 
offer were doubled. 
  In  total  444  workers  out  of  the  3657,  or  16  percent  of  the  sample,  were  offered  a 
retirement window during our observation period. Of those receiving an early retirement window, 
41% accept the offer and leave the employer.   
We  use  the  offering  of  a  window  as  an  instrument  for  retirement  behavior.  For  this 
instrument to be valid, two conditions need to hold. First, the offering of a window should be 
predictive for retirement, as defined as out of the labor force, or not having any paid employment.  
A regression of retirement on the offering of a window and a set of other control variables
7  
reveals that the offering of a window is a strong predictor for retirement. A window increases the 
probability of retirement with about 11 percentage points. The F-statistic is 38.7, which is well 
above the threshold value of 10 as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).  
Second, the offering of the window should be uncorrelated with the outcome variable of 
interest (health in our case). We regressed the offering of a window in a time period [t, t+2] on 
our health variables at time t. This regression also controls for white/blue-collar workers, age, 
age-squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race Hispanic, US born, the number of 
children and a wave of the interview indicator. As can be seen in table 2, none of the individual 
health variables is significant.  Also of note is the fact that only job characteristics such as tenure 
on job, union status and blue collar work (including more detailed occupation categories included 
in specification checks) and the education and race of the individual predict early retirement 
window receipt, which may also be picking up characteristics of the job.  Personal characteristics, 
such as marital status and number of children (including liking your job, finding your job stressful 
that were included in specification checks) are insignificant.    
 
                                                 
7 These include white/blue-collar workers, age, age-squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, 





5   Results 
 
This section presents the results of the health production models. We start with simple 
static models that include retirement as an explanatory variable along with a set of other control 
variables. These estimates are based on a comparison of the health status of those who retire early 
with those who retire later and hence measure the correlation between the health and retirement. 
Next  we  include  estimates  based  on  a  dynamic  model,  equation  (7’).  Allowing  for  state 
dependence may be particularly relevant for health outcomes that are persistent. The retirement 
coefficient will now pick up the effect of retirement, given previous health status. For persistent 
health measures like cancer and diabetes, this retirement coefficient reflects the effect of the onset 
of the disease.  
As argued in the previous sections, retirement is likely to be endogenous and therefore 
we also present estimates with retirement instrumented with the offering of an early retirement 
window. This model will give us the causal effect of retirement. For the dynamic models, we 
choose not to pursue further with Anderson-Hsiao (A-H) and Arellano–Bond (A-B) estimates. 
First, prime interest is in the effect of retirement on health and not in the effect of lagged health 
(or other exogenous characteristics).  Since the offering of the retirement window is unrelated to 
previous health, it is expected that the simple dynamic model with instrumented retirement (the 
dynamic IV model) will give us the causal effect of retirement on health. Second, the health 
shock is permanent for some of our health variables (cancer and diabetes), which will invalidate 
the use of A-H and A-B estimators.
8  We report the results of both the static IV and dynamic IV 
models, primarily for comparison. Both IV models provide consistent estimates of the causal 
effect of retirement on health. It should be noted, however, that the interpretation of the results of 
the two models differs, which is particularly relevant for health measures that display strong state 
dependence, such as cancer and diabetes.  
 
 
5.1 Baseline OLS results 
 Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of a simple static model for different health measures. 
In these regressions we relate current health to a set of controls and a variable indicating whether 
or not the individual has retired in the preceding 2-year interval. The controls include indicators 
                                                 
8 Blundell and Bond (1998) show that if health is persistent, such as a random walk, the differenced GMM 
performs badly because the lagged levels are poor instruments for changes in health. We have not estimated 
Blundell-Bond estimators because the stationarity assumption required for their method is also implausible 





for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, 
Hispanic, US-born, the number of children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. Table 4 
reports OLS estimates for dynamic health models. Besides the retirement coefficient we now also 
report the estimate of the lagged health variable. In both tables we correct the standard errors for 
repeated observations of the same person. The full tables, with all controls, are available upon 
request from the authors. 
Table 3 shows that the partial correlation coefficients are, apart from the coefficient for 
high blood pressure, all strongly significant, suggesting that retirement is negatively correlated 
with one’s health. For example, the chances of reporting good health decreases by almost 8.5 
percent if retired.  Similarly, chances of having diabetes, having cancer, having a heart attack, 
being depressed and having worse ADL scores increase with retirement. The dynamic estimation 
results of table 4 do not change this pattern. Allowing for state dependence reduces the magnitude 
of most coefficients. However, all but the coefficient for high blood pressure remain strongly 
significant. These results are in line with other studies that have relied on cross-sectional variation 
to assess the effect of retirement on health, such as Tsai et al (2005) and Dave et al (2006).  
Of course it is difficult to interpret these findings as causal. The simple OLS estimates are 
derived from a direct comparison of those who retire early with those who retire later and it is, for 
instance, conceivable that health shocks in the interval [t,t+2] have affected both health and the 
retirement decision. Furthermore, for some of the health measures included one may actually 
question whether the disease may manifest itself in such a short period. For instance, for cancer 
the OLS results of the dynamic model suggest that the onset of a cancer within 2 years increases 
by 2 percentage points. This is a large effect, given that the prevalence rate in the baseline wave is 
only 4 percent.  
 
5.2 IV estimates 
Tables 5 and 6 present IV estimates of the static and dynamic models. Both models lead 
to the simple conclusion that none of the significant effects found in the previous section remain.  
More precisely, the act of retirement does not have a negative impact on health within 2 years of 
retirement.  For  instance,  depression  is  strongly  positively  related  to  retirement  in  the  OLS 
regressions. The IV estimates of both the static and the dynamic model give about the same 
estimate, but with higher standard errors. Note that this cannot be due to a weak instrument 
problem as the first stage regressions showed strong and significant effects of the instrument on 
retirement. For some of the health variables we even find a change in the sign of the coefficient 





number of ADLs becomes negative and insignificant. The probability of reporting good health 
was significantly negatively affected by retirement in the OLS results. This IV results suggest that 
retirement leads to a 30 percent increase in the probability that an individual reports to be in good 
health. The effect is sizeable and significant at the 10% level. This finding is in line with the 
finding of Neuman (2007), who finds that retirement leads to significant improvement of self-
reported health.  
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 refer to the short term (within 2 years) of retirement. For 
the self-reported health and a mental health variable like ‘depression’ it is likely that, retirement 
can have an impact on the relatively short run. This might also be the case for a variable like 
‘high  blood  pressure’.  For  physical  measures  like  cancer  or  diabetes  and  probably  also  the 
number of ADLs short run effects are not likely. We therefore also estimated the longer run 
effects, by examining the effect of retirement in period [t,t+2] on health at t+4. The IV results are 
reported in tables 7 and 8 for the static and dynamic model, respectively. The OLS results (not 
reported  here)  all  confirm  what  we  already  found  in  tables  3  and  4:  retirement  in  [t,t+2]  is 
strongly negatively associated with health at t+4 . The IV estimates in tables 7 and 8 leads us to 
conclude again that retirement does not have a significant impact on health. There are, however, 
some  important  differences  with  the  results  of  tables  5  and  6.  First,  the  relatively  large  and 
positive effects  of retirement  on  the probability  of  ‘good  health’  have  now  vanished.    This 
suggests that the effect of retirement on good health is temporary.  Second, some variables like 
‘cancer’ and ‘diabetes’ and show strong persistence or state dependence. This can be seen from 
the large and significant coefficient of the lagged health variable in the dynamic models. For 
these variables the IV estimates of the static model yield large and sometimes significant effects 
of retirement. The estimates of static models (whether it is IV or OLS) also pick up the lagged 
health effect. For these variables with strong persistence it is advisable to look at the effect of 
retirement on the onset of the disease, rather than on the prevalence, by using a dynamic model.  
  Since we are finding little effect of retirement on health, one robustness check is to see if 
we  can  pick  up  any  causal relationship  between  retirement  and  mortality.   If we  do, it  would 
indicate that we are potentially missing something with our earlier results, either we are choosing 
the health variables incorrectly, or mis-specifying the relationship.  Table 9 presents the estimated 
effect of retirement on death as measured 4 (columns 1 and  2) and 6 (columns 3 and 4) years after 
the initial observation. Columns 1 and 3 present the OLS estimate, columns 2 and 4 report the IV 
results. The results of table 9 confirm our earlier findings. The OLS estimates hint at a strong 
statistical  relationship.  Retirement  is  correlated  with  increased  mortality  4  years  and  6  years 





mortality 4 years and 6 years afterwards, respectively). However, in line with our results for the 
health variables, both effects become insignificant when retirement is instrumented.   
  There is also reason to suspect that the effect of retirement might differ between individuals, 
especially between those who might have different types of job.  For example, a blue-collar worker 
with a physically demanding job might experience a different relationship between retirement and 
physical health than a white-collar worker.  Tables 10 and 11 presents the results of the IV estimates 
of the dynamic model by different blue and white collar workers. The OLS results (not reported 
here) suggest strong negative effects on health of retirement. The IV estimates of the subsample of 
blue and white collar workers are very similar to the results of table 6.  The effects on self-reported 
health seem to be concentrated on white-collar workers.  Retirement does not appear to have an 
effect on health. We also estimated the model for high (at least some college) and low educated 
workers. Also in these analyses the general picture that emerges is that there are little health effects 
of retirement. There one exception: the number of ADLs for higher educated workers. The dynamic 
IV estimates point at significant fewer ADLs (the coefficient equals -0.396 with a standard error of 
0.197). This implies that retirement is good for the health (as measured by the ADL score) for 
higher educated workers. It is difficult to speculate about specific mechanisms that may lead to this 
result, but it could be that in retirement higher educated workers can engage more in mobility 
enhancing physical activities. The IV estimate of the static model points to an even larger effect (-
0.471), but this estimate is only significant at the 10% level. We also considered other subgroups, 
such as people who are working in a stressful job versus those who are not, or people who like their 
job versus those who do not. These analyses did not result in new insights. Again it appears that the 
simple OLS estimates of the static and dynamic models show strong and significant effects, but as 
soon as retirement is instrumented none of the significant effects remain.  
Could it be that our finding of no health effects of retirement is due to our choice of 
instrument? We argued earlier that our instrument has strong predictive power, the F – test in the 
first stage regression equals 38.7, which far exceeds the value of 10 as suggested by Staiger and 
Stock (1997). Furthermore the offering of the window appeared to be unrelated to the health 
variables of interest. We also re-estimated our model with the instruments suggested by Charles 
(2002) and Neuman (2007). Both studies used the age specific incentives in the US social security 
system;  an  indicator  for  age  62  and  age  65.  The  IV  estimates  using  age  62  and  age  65  as 
instruments agree with our previous estimates of tables 5 and 6, where retirement is instrumented 
with the offering of a retirement window: retirement does not have any effect on health. There are 
however, two important differences. First, it appears in general that the IV estimates based on the 





anticipation effects may bias the results of retirement towards zero. Second, for the variable ‘good 
health’ the IV estimates of the static model now become significant at the 5% level (coefficient of 
0.1972 and standard error of 0.0099). This is also what Neuman (2007) finds. He also presents IV 
estimates of a static health model and concludes that retirement has a positive effect on self 
reported health. It is good to note that the IV estimates of the dynamic model with age 62 and age 
65 as instrument are not significant and hence confirm our finding that retirement does not have 
adverse effects on health.  
    
 
6  Conclusions 
 
This paper is concerned with the health effects of the act of retirement. This is an important 
question with pertinent policy consequences. As talk of raising retirement ages in pensions and 
social security schemes continues around the world, it is important to know both the costs and 
benefits for the individual as well as the government or pension fund’s budgets and health care 
expenditures. Up to now there are only a few studies that address this question. 
The notion that retirement harms health is an old and persistent hypothesis. Indeed, OLS 
estimates confirm that retirement is always associated with worse health outcomes. These effects 
are strongly significant and hold for a range of health variables. It is argued in earlier studies in 
the retirement literature and in some recent papers in this area (Charles 2002, Neuman 2007, 
Bound  and  Waidmann  2008,  Coe  and  Zamarro  2008)  that  health  and  work  choices  may  be 
endogenously related. We use the offering of an early retirement window as an instrument for 
retirement. Accounting for the fact that health and retirement are jointly determined changes the 
results dramatically.  
The IV estimates suggest that there are no negative health effects of retirement.  These 
findings hold for different types of workers and are robust with respect to the use of different 
instruments.  If anything, early retirement has a positive, but temporary, impact on self-reported 
health, whether this captures well-being, satisfaction, or different measures of health that we are 
not able to measure with the survey.  However, this temporary increase does not seem to manifest 
itself in other health measures in the short run (within two years) or long run (within four years or 
mortality up to 6 years later).  We also find some evidence of improvements in health for highly-





Since the effects are small and temporary, this reinforces the notion that recent trends in 
labor force participation and longevity are independent phenomena.  Further, since the measured 
effects are larger when retirement is unexpected, indicating that changes in public policy, such as 
the increases in the normal retirement age, are even less likely to have an effect for the demand 
for medical care or Medicare spending directly. 
The question that remains is whether this finding of no health effects of retirement is 
plausible. It is likely that there are little effects of retirement on diseases like cancer and diabetes 
in the short run to medium long run (2 to 4 years). Changes in the local environment and related 
changes in life styles may affect the likelihood of getting these diseases, but it is also very likely 
that it takes much longer than 2 or 4 years for these diseases to manifest themselves. The strong 
effects measured while using OLS for these diseases are therefore not plausible.  There is a recent 
literature examining the relationship between Health and Socio-Economic Status (SES): much of 
the association between SES and health during middle age and old age is driven by a causal effect 
of health on SES, rather than the other way around.  (See Adams et al. (2003) for the relation 
between wealth and health for an older population (70+) and Smith (2007) for a younger (<60) 
population. Case and Deaton (2006) find that much of the differences in health across the 
income  distribution  are  driven  by  health-related  absence  from  the  labor  force.)    Our 
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Table 1: Sample Means  
Variable  Whole Sample  Offered Window 
Demographics     
  Age  59.19  57.64 
  Years of Education  12.53  14.00 
  Married  0.85  0.85 
  Hispanic  0.05  0.03 
  No. Of Children  3.59  3.09 
  Blue collar  0.55  0.36 
Baseline Health     
  Good Health  0.54  0.64 
  Depressed (CES-D8 >4)  0.02  0.01 
  High Blood Pressure  0.34  0.34 
  Number of ADL’s  0.41  0.37 
  Diabetes  0.10  0.10 
  Cancer  0.04  0.04 
  Heart Attack  0.03  0.04 
2-years later     
  Out of the Labor Force  0.19  0.27 
  Receive a Window  0.06  1.00 
  Good Health  0.50  0.62 
  Depressed (CES-D8 >4)  0.02  0.02 
  High Blood Pressure  0.36  0.33 
  Number of ADL’s  0.51  0.59 
  Diabetes  0.12  0.11 
  Cancer  0.06  0.05 
       Heart Attack  0.02  0.01 






Table 2: Retirement Window Offerings are Orthogonal to Health
1 
Offered a Retirement 
Window (t, t+2) 




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Health Measure at t  0.0068  0.0011  0.0092  -0.0020  0.0115  0.0156  0.0212 
  (0.0056)  (0.0142)  (0.0056)  (0.0047)  (0.0081)  (0.0125)  (0.0170) 
Union member  0.0529***  0.0537***  0.0532***  0.0530***  0.0530***  0.0529***  0.0529*** 
  (0.0085)  (0.0087)  (0.0085)  (0.0085)  (0.0085)  (0.0085)  (0.0085) 
Tenure on Job  0.0029***  0.0030***  0.0029***  0.0029***  0.0029***  0.0029***  0.0029*** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Tenure   0.0823***  0.0803***  0.0814***  0.0818***  0.0814***  0.0816***  0.0818*** 
Unknown  (0.0177)  (0.0182)  (0.0177)  (0.0177)  (0.0177)  (0.0176)  (0.0177) 
< HS Education  0.0183**  0.0197***  0.0188***  0.0189***  0.0189***  0.0188***  0.0190*** 
  (0.0072)  (0.0074)  (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0072) 
HS Degree  0.0201**  0.0222**  0.0209**  0.0211**  0.0211**  0.0208**  0.0211** 
  (0.0086)  (0.0087)  (0.0085)  (0.0085)  (0.0085)  (0.0085)  (0.0085) 
Some College  0.0481***  0.0496***  0.0495***  0.0493***  0.0493***  0.0493***  0.0495*** 
  (0.0108)  (0.0108)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0105) 
Married  -0.0040  -0.0041  -0.0043  -0.0042  -0.0042  -0.0043  -0.0044 
  (0.0080)  (0.0082)  (0.0080)  (0.0080)  (0.0080)  (0.0080)  (0.0080) 
Caucasian  0.0361**  0.0394**  0.0363**  0.0363**  0.0378**  0.0361**  0.0360** 
  (0.0163)  (0.0177)  (0.0165)  (0.0162)  (0.0168)  (0.0162)  (0.0162) 
Black  0.0475***  0.0525***  0.0465***  0.0475***  0.0482***  0.0472***  0.0474*** 
  (0.0175)  (0.0189)  (0.0177)  (0.0174)  (0.0179)  (0.0174)  (0.0173) 
Number of   -0.0013  -0.0015  -0.0014  -0.0013  -0.0014  -0.0013  -0.0013 
Children  (0.0012)  (0.0013)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
Obs  11049  10735  11047  11049  11047  11046  11049 
R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     





Table 3: OLS results for static health production models
1 




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+2)  -0.0845***  0.0286***  0.0119  0.1369***  0.0270**  0.0218***  0.0338*** 
  (0.0121)  (0.0051)  (0.0114)  (0.0161)  (0.0085)  (0.0068)  (0.0050) 
R-squared  0.09  0.03  0.16  0.78  0.05  0.04  0.01 
Number of obs  11047  9294  11047  11055  11049  11045  11055 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1; Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 





Table 4: OLS results for dynamic health production models
1  




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+2)  -0.0546***  0.0271***  0.0050  0.1334***  0.0117*  0.0199***  0.0333*** 
  (0.0109)  (0.0050)  (0.0091)  (0.0154)  (0.0067)  (0.0052)  (0.0049) 
Health at t  0.4458***  0.1922***  0.5622***  0.4404***  0.6850***  0.7606***  0.1047*** 
  (0.0109)  (0.0363)  (0.0065)  (0.0441)  (0.0120)  (0.0177)  (0.0193) 
R-squared  0.27  0.05  0.43  0.80  0.44  0.44  0.03 
Number of obs  11047  10458  11047  11055  11049  11045  11055 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
1: Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 
children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. 








Table 5: IV results for static health production models
1  




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+2)  0.4358*  0.0287  0.1795  -0.1199  0.2198  0.0326  -0.0316 
  (0.2311)  (0.0577)  (0.1939)  (0.1205)  (0.1350)  (0.0958)  (0.0503) 
Adj R-squared  0.20  0.03  0.14  0.77  0.00  0.03  0.01 
Number of obs  11047  10458  11047  11055  11049  11045  11055 
The instrument is the offering of an early retirement window between t and t+2.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
1; Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 
children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. 
 
 
Table 6: IV results for dynamic health production models
1  




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+2)  0.3087*  0.0289  -0.0061  -0.1107  0.0873  -0.0388  -0.0421 
  (0.1728)  (0.0554)  (0.1424)  (0.1051)  (0.1003)  (0.0649)  (0.0475) 
Health at t  0.4612***  0.1920***  0.5623***  0.4434***  0.6822***  0.7611***  0.1068*** 
  (0.0132)  (0.0364)  (0.0066)  (0.0451)  (0.0126)  (0.0176)  (0.0195) 
Adj R-squared  0.19  0.04  0.43  0.79  0.43  0.43  0.03 
Number of obs  11047  10458  11047  11055  11049  11045  11055 
The instrument is the offering of an early retirement window between t and t+2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
1: Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 
children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. 






Table 7: IV results for static health production models: four years ahead
1  




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+4)  0.0918  0.0555  0.2367  0.0925  0.2798*  0.2149  0.0876 
  (0.2138)  (0.0646)  (0.2362)  (0.1927)  (0.1669)  (0.1391)  (0.0648) 
Adj R-squared  0.07  0.02  0.00  0.73  0.03  0.03  0.01 
Number of obs  9287  8680  9287  9293  9290  9286  9294 
The instrument is the offering of an early retirement window between t and t+2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
1; Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 
children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. 
 
 
Table 8: IV results for dynamic health production models: four years ahead
1  




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+4)  -0.0204  0.0535  -0.0173  0.0885  0.0753  0.1125  0.0779 
  (0.1744)  (0.0624)  (0.1468)  (0.1823)  (0.1137)  (0.0947)  (0.0630) 
Health at t  0.4080***  0.2115***  0.7597***  0.4805***  0.8636***  0.8478***  0.0743*** 
  (0.0136)  (0.0412)  (0.0089)  (0.0643)  (0.0116)  (0.0197)  (0.0194) 
Adj R-squared  0.24  0.04  0.47  0.75  0.48  0.35  0.02 
Number of obs  9287  8680  9287  9293  9290  9286  9294 
The instrument is the offering of an early retirement window between t and t+2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
1: Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 






Table 9: Effect of retirement on Mortality four years ahead (t+4) and six years ahead (t+6)  
  Mortality within four years   Mortality within six years  
Mortality  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Retired (t, t+2)  0.0250***  -0.0533  0.0413***  0.0072 
  (0.0047)  (0.0414)  (0.0070)  (0.0700) 
Observations  10078  10078  8753  8753 
R-squared  0.12  0.08  0.08  0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
Note: Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 
children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. 
 
Table 10: Blue collar workers: IV results for dynamic health production models
1  




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+2)  0.1391  0.0819  -0.1276  -0.0063  0.0932  -0.0059  -0.0924 
  (0.2927)  (0.1146)  (0.2152)  (0.2188)  (0.1467)  (0.0962)  (0.1178) 
Health at t  0.4016***  0.1816***  0.5616***  0.4170***  0.6863***  0.7527***  0.1328*** 
  (0.0216)  (0.0428)  (0.0092)  (0.0574)  (0.0176)  (0.0252)  (0.0337) 
Adj R-squared  0.18  0.02  0.42  0.76  0.43  0.43  0.08 
Number of obs  6085  5701  6085  6091  6083  6087  5064 
The instrument is the offering of an early retirement window between t and t+2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
1: Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 
children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. 






Table 11: White collar workers: IV results for dynamic health production models
1  




# of ADL   Diabetes  Cancer   Heart Attack 
Retired(t, t+2)  0.4062*  -0.0036  0.0335  -0.1618  0.0830  -0.0764  0.0482 
  (0.2219)  (0.0579)  (0.1947)  (0.1073)  (0.1388)  (0.0893)  (0.0555) 
Health at t  0.5255***  0.2143***  0.5616***  0.5180***  0.6759***  0.7689***  0.0762*** 
  (0.0174)  (0.0676)  (0.0100)  (0.0791)  (0.0192)  (0.0253)  (0.0246) 
Adj R-squared  0.19  0.03  0.43  0.84  0.44  0.42  0.01 
Number of obs  4962  4757  4962  4964  4961  4958  4230 
The instrument is the offering of an early retirement window between t and t+2.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
1: Regressions also contain: controls for white/blue-collar worker, age, age squared, education, marital status, net worth deciles, race, Hispanic, US-born, the number of 
children, and a wave-of-interview indicator variable. 
 
 